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Some studies argue that credit booms that end up in banking crises are usually longer 
than those that end without creating havoc. However, they do not test this hypothesis 
empirically. This paper employs a duration model to assess the relationship between the 
length of credit booms and their outcome. The empirical analysis shows that credit expansions 
that end in banking crisis are indeed more prone to last longer than those that end softly. 
Furthermore, differences in length patterns are found to start in the build-up phase, extending 
to the unwinding phase of credit cycles. 
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1. Introduction 
The growing importance of credit in the day to day economic activity of individuals, 
firms and governments has been a clear trend in recent decades. Today, credit is everywhere 
and stands as an essential tool to promote investment and economic prosperity. However, 
history has taught us that this apparent virtuous cycle eventually comes to an end with 
unforeseen consequences to the economy. It is a dangerous gamble as showed by the recent 
global financial triggered, in part, by a swift increase of mortgage loans in the United States. 
Some credit booms are indeed followed by moments of intense financial distress banking and 
economic crises (Jordà et al., 2011; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Boissay et al., 2016; Jordà 
et al., 2016). Our data reports this to be the case for one out of four credit expansions 
identified from 1975 to 2016. The significant number of disaster events contributed decisively 
to the belief that credit booms need to be monitored and better understood. 
One fundamental question regarding credit expansions is how to anticipate their benign 
or malignant nature, and researchers have tried to identify differences between them but with 
limited success. All in all, the most consistent conclusion found in the literature is that 
harmful credit booms (or bad credit booms) tend to exhibit larger magnitudes and longer 
durations. Barajas et al. (2009) found that around 40% of credit expansions lasting between 9 
and 12 years end up in a crisis and for those over 13 years this is a virtual certainty. When 
analyzing the length of credit booms, Arena et al. (2015) report that approximately half of 
those that end in a banking crisis last for over six years while only 25 percent of benign 
booms last this long. The conclusion that longer expansions have a higher probability of being 
associated with a banking crisis is reported by several studies (see Gourinchas et al., 2001; 
Castro and Kubota, 2013; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016 Meng and Gonzalez, 2017). However, as 
far as we are concerned, only Castro and Kubota (2013) use adequate statistical methods as an 
attempt to address this issue. Relying on a continuous-time Weibull duration model, they 
provide evidence of positive duration dependence in credit booms, in general, and in those 
that end badly, in particular. 
This paper contributes to the literature on credit booms in various directions and goes 
beyond Castro and Kubota’s (2013) work in several ways. First, we employ a discrete-time 
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duration model that allows for the inclusion of (time-varying) economic explanatory 
variables. This provides a more complete control of the economic environment. Second, we 
use a different set of criteria to define episodes of credit booms (different thresholds and 
detrending techniques). Third, regarding bad credit booms, Castro and Kubota (2013) only 
show the presence of duration dependence in their dynamics; in this study we move a step 
forward and compare bad with good credit booms dynamics. This approach makes it possible 
to provide the (lacking) statistical evidence that bad credit booms tend to last longer than 
good ones. Fourth, we extend the duration analyses to the build-up and unwinding phases of 
the credit cycle, assessing whether they are fundamentally alike or not. This particular 
analysis also allows us to identify whether different patterns emerge when credit cycles are 
split into those that generate harmful outcomes and those that do not. Finally, we rely on a 
more extensive quarterly dataset covering 67 countries from 1975q1 to 2016q4. 
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that harmful credit expansions are 
indeed more prone to last longer than those that land softly. It also shows that their build-up 
and unwinding phases differ, thus generating distinct credit cycles. This study concludes that 
duration can be used as an early warning instrument to evaluate the benign or malignant 
nature of credit booms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature while 
Section 3 presents the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The investigation on credit booms has been conducted mainly through data analysis and 
the literature has highlighted the association between credit expansions and macroeconomic 
dynamics. Rises in capital inflows, productivity shocks and general improvements in the 
economy, allied to excessive optimism, are found to explain the build-up of such events (see, 
for instance, Mendoza and Terrones, 2008, 2012; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016; Puspa D. Amri et 
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al., 2016; Avdjiev et al., 2018; Castro and Martins, 2019). Additionally, financial reforms 
associated with financial liberalization and domestic differences such as expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies, less flexible exchange rate regimes, debt composition and weak 
supervision of the banking system are also associated with periods of abnormal credit growth 
(Elekdag and Wu 2013; Arena et al., 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016; Avdjiev et al., 2018). 
Estimating a fixed effects logit model over a panel of developed and developing 
countries, Castro and Martins (2019) show that credit booms depend not only on the quantity 
of credit but are also influenced by its relative price. Likewise, economic growth and 
economic openness also build-up the conditions for the appearance of lending booms. They 
also report that economies that can generate more liquidity are less likely to be affected by 
credit booms. 
Banking crisis are often associated with excessive credit expansions. The circumstances 
in which this happens has been an important topic of research. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) point 
out that a higher level of financial depth increases the probability of a boom ending badly. 
Arena et al. (2015) found that when credit booms end in banking crisis, macroeconomic 
fluctuations seem to be larger and exhibit more sudden declines. According to Meng and 
Gonzalez (2017), this is also the case when the dimension of the financial sector grows, 
particularly above macroeconomic consistent levels. Yet, they report no association between 
bad booms and macroeconomic and financial policies – exception made to the quality of 
regulations and supervision of the banking system. 
In a recent work, Castro and Martins (2018) found that credit booms that are driven by 
high levels of capital inflows and/or by increases in the ratio of credit to deposits and those 
that are generally supported by lower interest rates tend to have an increased likelihood of 
ending up in a full blown banking crisis. However, the opposite seems to happen when right 
wing parties are in office. The authors also report that, bad credit expansions are less likely to 
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occur under the watch of more independent Central Banks. However, the literature has 
struggled to find consistent differences between good and bad credit expansions. Some papers 
– like, for example, Gourinchas et al. (2001) – actually report no relevant changes in key 
macroeconomic variables between them. Overall, the difficulty in finding consistent 
predictors that can support or extend theoretical models has restricted the ability for empirical 
studies to present more credible policy recommendations. 
Nevertheless, most studies seem to agree that credit booms gone badly are associated 
with larger magnitudes and longer durations, but to reach this conclusion most of them rely on 
comparative descriptive statistics and graphical analysis. The exceptions are Meng and 
Gonzales (2017) and Castro and Kubota (2013). The former collapse their panel data into a 
cross-section and estimate probit models where the dependent variable takes value of 1 if a 
credit boom episode is followed within two years by a banking crisis (and 0 otherwise) and 
add to the regressors a variable measuring the length of each boom. The later uses a 
continuous-time Weibull duration model to confirm the length nexus of credit booms. None 
of them provides a comparative analysis between the duration dynamics of bad and good 
credit booms. This paper embraces that endeavour and confirms statistically the existence of 
differences in the duration pattern of good and bad lending expansions.  
 
3. Econometric model 
For the duration analysis developed in this study, we rely on Prentice and Gloeckler’s 
(1978) discrete-time version of the proportional hazards duration model,1 with the respective 
discrete-time hazard function given by:2 
 
1 Although the time spell of credit booms is a continuous-time process, the available data are discrete (quarters). 
In addition, the potential conditioning factors of their duration vary over time. Hence, discrete-time duration 
methods are more suitable for this study than continuous-time ones. For examples of empirical applications in 
Economics see Castro (2010), Agnello et al. (2013), Castro and Martins (2013) and Agnello et al. (2015, 2018). 
